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The article argues that there is a central problem with the concept of public philosophy, in that philosophy is 
partly defined by questioning reflection on its own sense, while public or popular culture characteristically 
relies unreflectively on its ultimate givens, and these are mutually exclusive modes of thought. The article 
proposes, however, that because of philosophy’s reflection on and potential questioning of its own sense it has 
a paradoxical structure of foundational and comprehensive conflict with itself and its own procedure, and that 
this self-divergence allows a genuinely philosophical role for public philosophy. In the public context, 
acknowledged failure to understand beyond a certain point makes room for a limitation of sense that 
incompletely but effectively substitutes for the properly philosophical explicit and questioning reflection on 
the nature of sense as such and on the possibility that even what we do understand about the relevant issues 
fails to have sense. 





[M]etaphysics consists of the fact that man seeks a basic orientation in his situation. 
But this assumes that man’s situation—that is, his life—consists of a basic 
disorientation. . . . [M]an’s situation, his life, in itself is disorientation, is being lost, 
and, therefore, metaphysics exists. (Ortega y Gasset, 1969, 27) 
 
I begin by provisionally supporting the widespread idea that there is a central problem with 
the concept of public philosophy, in that what is definitive of philosophy and what is 
characteristic of public or popular culture are in sharp conflict with each other. I argue 
specifically that philosophy is defined partly by a questioning reflection on its own sense, 
while public culture characteristically relies unreflectively on its ultimate givens, two modes 
of thought that are in fact mutually exclusive. I try to show, however, that because of 




philosophy’s reflection on and potential questioning of its own sense it has a paradoxical 
structure of foundational and comprehensive conflict with itself and so with its own 
procedure, and that this self-divergence allows a genuinely philosophical role for public 
philosophy, although it is not the same role that philosophy has in the more limited contexts 
that are more fully suited to it. In the public context, acknowledged failure to understand 
beyond a certain point makes room for a limitation of sense that, I argue, can successfully 
substitute for the properly philosophical explicit and questioning reflection on the nature of 
sense as such and on the possibility that even the questions at issue themselves and what we 
do understand of their answers fail to have sense. 
 
1. A Picture of What Philosophy Is 
 
Before we can decide questions about public philosophy, we first need a picture of what 
philosophy is or at least of what is relevantly essential to it. I suggest that one way to 
characterize philosophy is that it involves reflection on conceptual structures each as a 
whole, or even on our entire framework for sense as a whole, in one or another respect. For 
example, philosophers centrally reflect on what it is that differentiates one concept from 
another, and in doing so reflect on the concept itself rather than employing it, as already 
adequately given, to identify particulars that fall under it. So, for instance, we may try to 
establish what “good” means when it is used to describe moral qualities, rather than taking 
it as already clear what we mean by “good” and going ahead to apply that concept and 
decide whether or not, say, being brave or acting unselfishly are good. Again, philosophers 
centrally reflect on the nature and functioning of sense or meaning in general. For instance, 
they explore how the limits of what we can possibly mean, of how our language can 
successfully signify what we try to use it to signify, set limits for meaningful questions 
about what we can know. Or they explore how our possibilities for making sense allow only 
certain answers about the nature of reality to make sense at all, to have any meaning. 
 
One picture for this kind of activity is that it involves what we might describe as stepping 
partly outside our categories or our sense frameworks—outside what we usually take for 
granted as, say, the meaning of “good,” or outside what we usually assume is the way sense 
or meaning works and is possible. What I mean by “stepping outside” these frameworks or 
categories is that to investigate them we occupy, or at least try to occupy, a space that is in 
some sense partly independent of the sense we are investigating: otherwise we are simply 
presupposing, circularly, what we claim to be inquiring into. Since what we are “stepping 
outside” is the sense of the particular concept or issue as a whole, or even of sense in 
general as a whole, we are stepping partly outside any relevant sense. In other words, we are 
stepping outside of making sense altogether, outside of sense itself. 




If this picture is accurate, philosophy involves an essential element or moment of failure of 
sense. As I shall discuss below, it is crucial to understanding the role of public philosophy 
that this kind of failure of sense is an element that is inherent in philosophical insight. 
 
There are powerful objections to the idea that we can look at our sense framework or our 
conceptual structures each as an independent whole, and even to the meaningfulness of this 
idea (for example, Davidson, 1984). Just on the face of it, it seems clear that if we did 
manage to make what we say independent of what we usually understand by sense and 
meaning, we would not know what we were saying! There are also, however, prominent 
defenses of both this idea’s meaningfulness and possibility (for example, Derrida, 1981, 6; 
Nagel, 1979). Again just on the face of it, it does seem to make sense that we need to be 
able to account for our meanings and for the possibility of there being such a thing as 
meaning at all. For example, it seems clearly meaningful to ask what makes meaning itself 
different from other elements of the world, or how (and if) what we collectively and in 
general call “meanings” can successfully connect with the things of the world they 
supposedly refer to or express, or to ask how what we call “meaning” emerged in the first 
place if the world began as inanimate matter. And in asking these questions we are 
reflecting on sense or meaning as a whole. We are then in a sense looking at it from outside 
all of it. 
 
In fact, that philosophy inherently aims at a vantage point on sense as a whole and so goes 
beyond it is more or less explicit in the mainstreams of both the analytic and the continental 
traditions of philosophy. In the analytic tradition, the early Wittgenstein, for example, 
famously argues that philosophy’s business is to attempt to describe the world and sense as 
a whole, but that since our attempts to describe sense as a whole depend on a pre-existing 
grasp of at least elements of that same sense, in making these attempts we are essentially 
repeating ourselves. As a result, our attempts to grasp sense as a whole turn out to add 
nothing, and so to be empty of sense. They must therefore be discarded. But this process is 
not useless; it has allowed us to see what the nature of the problem is, what it is like to try to 
grasp sense as a whole. While our attempts turn out not to have sense and must be 
discarded, then, they must be discarded like a ladder that has successfully served its purpose 
and taken us to a vantage point from which we can see more clearly and fully than we did 
before (1961, 74, prop. 6.54). A related idea is present in Wittgenstein’s later work and also 
characterizes the kind of conceptual analysis, widely practiced in contemporary analytic 
philosophy and often in the history of philosophy, that establishes the boundaries of 
meaningful concept usage: “The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another 
piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up 




against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery” (1958, 
48e, no. 119). 
 
In the continental tradition of philosophy, Karl Jaspers argues that, in exploring the 
fundamental questions of philosophy, while “we have used words and concepts which had 
their original meaning for definite things in the world; now however they are used to go 
beyond the limits and are not to be understood in their original sense;” as a result, “Through 
reason I catch sight of something which is only communicable in the form of contradiction 
and paradox. Here a rational a-logic arises, a true reason which reaches its goal through the 
shattering of the logic of the understanding” (1997, 111-112). Similarly, Jacques Derrida 
explains that, “I try to write the question: (what is) meaning to say? Therefore it is necessary 
[in order not circularly to pre-judge what meaning involves] . . . that writing literally mean 
nothing” (1981, 14, my insertion). 
 
There are traditional objections, too, to the idea that admitting an element of 
incoherence into a logical structure can do anything but eliminate the sense of that 
structure altogether. It is a commonplace in Western logic, for example, that the 
acceptance of a self-contradiction explodes into the acceptance of any statement 
whatever (see, for example, Haack, 1978, 22, 202). First, however, there is a growing 
literature that defends the contextualized legitimacy of contradiction in both formal and 
informal contexts (for example, Bremer, 2005; Johnstone, 1978, 45; Priest, 2001). It is, 
then, no longer uncontroversially accepted that logical inconsistency is necessarily 
illegitimate and unmanageable. Second, we can understand intuitively that our reflecting 
on the nature of sense is compatible with and in fact requires us to consider the 
possibility that the terms of our current reflection themselves may turn out not to make 
sense.1 The well-known self-reflexive paradoxes, like the Liar’s Paradox, then, in which 
statements refer to themselves in the way that a statement like “this statement does not 
make sense” does, and so both affirm and deny themselves, are not simply a fringe 
phenomenon, but expressions of a structure fundamental to philosophical thought.2 
 
I have argued that reflection on sense as such involves a departure from sense. Since it is 
sense itself that requires this departure (it makes sense that a reflection on sense cannot 
simply presuppose what it reflects on), this departure from sense is ultimately part of the 
functioning of sense itself. Consequently, sense is partly constituted by something like a 
varying from itself, or not entirely coinciding with itself. As a result, our awareness too, 
whose contents and substance consist at least to a large extent in meanings or instances of 
sense, is partly constituted as something that does not entirely coincide with itself. 
 




It follows that philosophy, which fundamentally or ultimately consists in this self-diverging 
reflection on sense, is a dimension, and even the deepest dimension, of all awareness. 
 
2. Philosophy and the Public 
 
This picture of philosophy is in keeping with both of two possibly opposed ideas about the 
relation between philosophy and the general public. (That this picture makes room for 
both of them helps to confirm its correctness, since both of these ideas have reasonable 
grounds.) On the one hand, it endorses the widespread idea that philosophy deals with 
matters of concern to all human beings and, further, that it is the expression of a level of 
thought that, in one way or another, is present in all human lives. On the other hand, it 
also makes sense of the idea, also widespread, that most people are not capable of or 
motivated to engage in the level of thought in which philosophy consists. Since, on the 
picture I am proposing, philosophy is not continuous with everyday sense but involves a 
violation of it, pursuing it means departing radically from our customary procedures of 
sense-making, and consequently unsettling our sense of reality and of ourselves. Even 
though this departure from sense is part of us, it is so in a way that conflicts 
fundamentally with how we are when we are not reflecting on sense. When fundamental 
questions become relevant to us, then, engaging with them is not an activity that is 
essentially continuous with although more demanding than our customary sense-making 
practices, but instead deeply unsettles them. Consequently, though the fundamental 
questions may be part of us and therefore spontaneously motivating, exercising that part 
of us requires a departure from ourselves that is extremely challenging both intellectually 
and emotionally. Differently expressed, the part of us in which philosophical depth 
consists is that part which is equally a departure from being a part of us. There are 
therefore understandable difficulties with entering into its exercise. 
 
Even if this were the whole truth (and I argue that it is an important part of the truth), this is 
not to say philosophy belongs to the academic or highbrow worlds. If it belongs to an elite, 
it is a different kind of elite that cuts across all sorts of customary status distinctions. The 
capacity for departing from and unsettling sense and ourselves that makes the difference is 
mostly independent of both cultural sophistication and, in fact, intelligence. Neither 
sophistication nor intelligent thought necessarily require stepping outside the conventions 
(whether, respectively, of culture or thought), and in fact typically require taking the 
relevant conventions for granted and relying on them. And people of very limited intellect 
and no refinement can experience existential crises and insights, while highly intelligent 
people can be philosophically blind. 
 




Both apparently opposed ideas, that philosophy comes naturally in some way to everyone 
and, on the other hand, that it is inaccessible to the vast majority of people, have the support 
of everyday experience. It is evident that most people ask the fundamental philosophical 
questions at some point in their lives (for example, what is the point of it all? Is any real 
knowledge possible, given how often and unpredictably we make mistakes?), and often ask 
them at those times as real, pressing questions. It is also seems to be the case, however, that 
most people either give up on the questions, which, perhaps, simply lose their pressing 
nature over time, or they find answers that are not philosophical, that do not address the 
nature of sense itself, and that are consequently couched in terms the possible 
questionableness of whose sense is not a concern. 
 
It seems at least anecdotally evident that for most people the philosophical level of thought 
is not a live option, and often simply not an option of which they are intellectually or 
emotionally capable. It requires a willingness to forgo the kinds of certainties and stabilities 
of meaning and sense that define intellectual competence in everyday life and in most 
professional or technical fields. From that point of view, it is often understandably 
experienced as an absurd proposal: to think in a way that blatantly neglects and even rejects 
what life-long experience tells us is competence in thinking through issues. (For example, 
students often complain that philosophy is circular, or that it offers no definitive or reliable 
answers.) In addition, as I have argued, from this point of view philosophical thought is 
deeply emotionally unsettling. In short, there is no particular reason from the viewpoint of 
everyday, unreflective consciousness why people should be motivated to undertake a task 
that is threatening, arduous, and highly questionable as to prospects for offering helpful 
results and even as to its meaningfulness. More, even apart from the intellectual and 
emotional demands of philosophical thought, most people typically have demanding life 
preoccupations and no time or apparent reason to have interest in pursuing anything so 
unrelated to their resulting intuitive concerns. 
 
While these considerations are anecdotal, they also seem palpably true, given how most 
people in Western cultures live their lives, and also how most people evidently find it 
appropriate to live out their opinions: assertively, not particularly articulately, and without 
seeing the point of extended, impersonal debate about them. This is not to mention the—
arguably well and deeply grounded—commitments of other cultures, and also many 
Western subcultures, where arduous thought is not even a candidate for offering answers to 
life’s questions. 
 
Even Plato’s Socratic dialogues, the historically outstanding examples of the practice of 
public philosophy, seem to endorse this side of the picture, given their typical outcomes not 




only in the discussants’ failure to find remotely satisfactory answers to the questions they 
pursue, but also in Socrates’ frequent failure to communicate the nature and value of the 
kind of inquiry he has been proposing. 
 
If this is the whole story, then it seems that all public philosophy can hope to do is to speak 
to those relatively few hearers or readers who are emotionally and intellectually capable of 
“stepping outside” sense itself and are motivated to do so, while the vast majority of its 
audience, although perhaps intrigued by the aesthetics and challenge of logical puzzles and 
the subtle thought that produces and attempts to solve them, will not register the properly 
philosophical dimensions, the reworking of sense as such, in what is being said. 
 
But my proposal is that, while there is a sharp difference in what is registered by the 
philosophical minority and the non-philosophical majority, the important difference here is 
not between fundamental reflection (or “stepping outside sense”) and no or only sporadic 
and accidental fundamental reflection, but between engaged and unengaged fundamental 
reflection. Differently expressed, the difference is between engaged non-self-coincidence 
and unengaged non-self-coincidence. 
 
As I have argued, those who cannot engage in or explicitly exercise their own non-self-
coincidence cannot engage in philosophy, which is essentially that exercise of non-self-
coincidence. Instead, when they encounter philosophy they necessarily translate it into 
something else, a view or theory or ideology the sense of whose fundamentals is definitively 
given. The resulting insights can be deep in the sense that they acknowledge serious and 
difficult human concerns. But they are not deep in the further, foundational sense that 
belongs to philosophy, in that they include perspective on the nature and conditions of their 
own sense itself and, as a result, on the nature of relevant reality as such, since that is part of 
what sense is the sense of. 
 
One example of the difference is that the non-philosophically deep are concerned with the 
grave needs and commitments of others; the philosophically deep are concerned with 
relating to others as who they essentially are. From the non-philosophical standpoint, a 
person’s being does not mean anything other than the sum or whole of her/his qualities. 
While it is possible to hold this position philosophically, that depends on being able to 
consider the distinction between being and the sum of properties a mistake, in contrast with 
not being able to recognize it as an option at all. 
 
It is possible, however, and this seems confirmed by common experience of public 
reception of philosophy, that many of the readers and hearers I am calling non-philosophical 




also recognize that they are in fact making a translation, that they are re-explaining what has 
been said in terms that may not precisely capture it: that they are making a kind of best 
approximation of something perhaps not fully grasped. In this respect, they do connect with 
the non-self-coincidence or partial failure of the sense of what is said. Those unengaged in 
their non-self-coincidence, then, do understand philosophy, but they do so by recognizing 
that they likely do not understand something fundamental to it, that something fundamental 
has escaped them. (In contrast, those engaged in their own non-self-coincidence can 
recognize and explore the tension within sense itself: they can recognize not simply that 
they fail to understand, but that understanding itself has become different, in some sense no 
longer self-coincident.) Non-philosophical readers or hearers, that is, understand philosophy 
indirectly or tangentially: they make contact with it, but what they are making with is not 
explicit for them. 
 
Philosophy is what it is because of its depth, because of its stepping outside itself to 
investigate its own bases. Public philosophy, then, cannot be less deep than other 
philosophy and still be philosophy at all. I suggest, however, that it works by being both 
indirectly and much less completely explained. The reflection on the boundaries between 
sense and loss of sense needs to be intimated, but the details and subtleties of the work with 
those boundaries need to be left out, because these details occur at the level of explicit 
reflection on sense as such that people unengaged with their own non-self-coincidence 
cannot get to. 
 
Consequently, it is public philosophy’s job, first, to express its themes in such a way that 
their sense is conveyed, but with most of the difficulty avoided. Since, however, these are 
difficulties with the sense of what is conveyed, they can only be avoided by being disguised. 
The form of expression must manage to bypass what is nonetheless the ongoing presence of 
these difficulties. It might, for example, be quietly simplistic and vague in their respect 
while being clear in showing how the result that resolves them gives helpful insights into 
the initial issue. 
 
Second, public philosophy must convey that something peculiarly difficult, something that 
remains enigmatic, is involved that has not been expressed but is essential to what the 
reader or hearer has grasped. That is, it must convey that the sense that has been grasped is 
part of something more that renders it, while in some way importantly right, still tentative, 
and for reasons that are themselves hard to express, so that exactly what about the relevant 
sense they make tentative cannot be clearly and securely captured. This non-specificity 
preserves an approximation of the questionableness of the relevant sense itself. The reader 




or hearer is then aware that something questionable remains in their own grasp of what has 
been said. 
 
For example, in a popular philosophical presentation of Leibniz’s proof of the existence of 
God, Jeff McLaughlin explains that “in order for something to be perfect, it is necessary 
that that entity must also exist. . . . In other words, if God did not exist, we could imagine 
a greater being, namely one that did exist” (2005, 7). He clarifies this through the more 
everyday point that an imaginary world “would be less than perfect for me for even 
though my life is better in it . . . I don’t exist in that world because there is no world to 
exist in” (6). On the one hand, McLaughlin says only enough about the concept of 
perfection to convey the sense of the argument, and he does so by explaining it in 
intuitive, everyday terms. He does not dwell on the difficulties of the concept, which 
would require discussing issues like different degrees of reality or, as in Descartes’ 
version of the argument, different types of reality, like formal and objective reality. That 
level of discussion would take us entirely outside the range of familiar concepts into a 
realm of meanings that need to be learned entirely in their own context, because they are 
specialized for talking about sense and reality in their own right, and are consequently 
literally meaningless in the context of the world of things we ordinarily discuss. In 
addition to not dwelling on the difficulties of the concept itself, the everyday parallel 
McLaughlin gives is sufficiently satisfying that for the reader who does not naturally 
reflect on the sense of concepts the need to explore those further difficulties does not seem 
urgent. That there is some sense to the argument seems clear (while, for the philosophical 
reader, it remains open that, although its terms appear to have sense, they may turn out not 
to have had any sense at all, because they are so detached from the world of ordinary 
things the sense of which they are ultimately supposed to help account for). In these ways, 
McLaughlin disguises the difficulties with the sense of what he is saying. 
 
On the other hand, the concept of perfection is naturally very elusive for the common sense 
of our time. Students introduced to this kind of material for the first time invariably dismiss 
the arguments because of what they see as the vagueness of concepts like “perfection.” In 
making an argument with this concept at least partly plausible, then, elusive as this concept 
naturally is for our culture’s sensibilities, McLaughlin also succeeds in keeping open the 
awareness that something enigmatic is inherent in the sense of what is being said and so in 
the sense the reader grasps. 
 
If I may take a second example from a popular philosophical article on House, M.D. and 
Zen rhetoric that I co-authored, the authors point out that to “make sense of our lives as a 
whole . . . we’d have to be able to step outside of our lives and see them as a whole,” but 




“all our ways of making sense are parts of our lives, so that if we could step outside our 
lives, we’d of course also step outside all our ways of making sense! The result is that the 
idea of making sense of our lives as a whole literally doesn’t make any sense” (2010, 300). 
Nonetheless, the authors continue, “to make sense of our lives and the things that happen in 
them, we need to be able to get a grip on them, to make sense of them, as a whole. As a 
result, the Zen tradition advises us to go right ahead and step outside of sense itself, 
altogether. The standpoint that would allow us to get a perspective on our lives and sense as 
a whole is the standpoint, or starting point, of not making sense” (301). The authors 
describe the paradox of reflecting on sense, but do not dwell on it or try to give an account 
of it. Instead, they focus on the ways in which it appears to be parallel to non-paradoxical 
analogues: they treat the state of not making sense as a standpoint or a “place” comparable 
to what we usually think of as standpoints, that is, to particular ways of making sense. That 
appearance of equivalence to our usual understanding of standpoints then allows them to 
proceed without entering into the complexities of the ways in which the sense of their own 
subsequent statements is potentially transformed or violated. Here is that parallel treatment 
again: “Only by not thinking and acting in sensible or “fitting” or appropriate ways can we 
arrive at sense and sensible action” (301). Not making sense is treated here as the state prior 
to making sense, and so as comparable with it in being intelligible as an identifiable state. In 
these ways, again, the authors disguise the difficulties with the sense of what they are 
saying. But because it is a blatant paradox they are treating in this way, its enigmatic 
character, the elusiveness of its sense, again also remains alive for the reader. 
 
Finally, in a philosophical magazine article on whether humans and other animals can be 
friends, Stephen Clark points out that to answer this question we first need to ask about the 
meaning of friendship itself (2008, 13). That is, before we apply the concept, we need to 
reflect on it in its own right. But then, having drawn our attention to the concept itself and 
our uncertainty about its sense, and after considering some traditional ideas about what is 
essential to it, Clark actually side-steps negotiating among these ideas and coming to a 
decision about friendship’s general sense, and instead offers a particular feature of our 
everyday understanding of the concept as a possibly fruitful entry point to answering his 
initial question. “It is worth asking,” he writes, “whether our common sense . . . has any 
grounds for saying that animals can’t manage what we manage in terms of basic emotions” 
(15). The result is a thought-provoking explanation of why our relationships with other 
animals share many important features with what we think of as friendships among 
ourselves, an explanation that proceeds without having to engage with the difficulties of 
establishing the sense of the concept itself. Clark has nonetheless, however, drawn our 
attention to the relevance and uncertainty of the underlying concept by his initial discussion 
of it. In addition, the idea of people-like friendships with other animals is sufficiently 




questionable in our culture that a plausible case for it automatically puts in question our 
usual relevant ways of making sense. The author, then, has disguised the difficulties with 
the underlying sense of his discussion while keeping alive an awareness of the elusiveness 
of that sense. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious way for public philosophers to disguise the deeper difficulties, 
and the one that is probably most common, is to simplify, leaving out most of the relevant 
arguments and all of those that involve more subtle considerations. But this must not go so 
far that it eliminates the elusive, inherently enigmatic dimensions of the issues. Much of 
what is done as popular philosophy that relies on this kind of simplification seems to me to 
fail in this respect. 
 
Public philosophy, then, is for those who can register that the limits of sense (or at least of 
given sense) play a role in achieved sense, but who cannot register this explicitly and as 
such. They can explicitly recognize that understanding fails, but not that this failure is part 
of the functioning of sense and understanding themselves. In being unable to “step outside” 
sense, they also cannot explore the character and details of the functioning of sense, at least 
not while recognizing what they are doing as precisely that, an exploration of sense itself. 
Even though this explicit recognition is limited, however, it nonetheless accurately captures 
the deep significance of the failure of understanding, because it experiences this failure as 
somehow inherent in or essential to what has been grasped, even if it is obscure exactly how 
it is so. 
 
3. Philosophy in the Classroom and Public Philosophy 
 
This account of public philosophy has consequences for teaching philosophy in the 
classroom, because philosophy in the classroom often is in fact public philosophy. There 
is typically no selection process for philosophy students that has to do with the nature of 
philosophy, except as philosophy is popularly understood; and this, I have argued, 
specifically excludes philosophy’s self-understanding. Philosophy at least in the 
introductory classroom is therefore in fact dealing with the audience for public 
philosophy. Consequently, when it is taught as philosophy proper there, it is mis-
practiced. It is then taught in the light of false expectations as to possible outcomes for 
most of the students, and so is not designed to achieve its own appropriate goals with 
respect to those students. Since it engages in fully explicit reflection on the nature of 
relevant sense itself, where it should be making for incomplete though successful 
understanding or, differently expressed, partial misunderstanding tempered by a sense of 
the inherent limitations of human understanding in these deep contexts, it can only 




produce complete misunderstanding. It also then leads these students firmly away from 
and so obscures what philosophy might genuinely offer them. 
 
Philosophy in the classroom, then, needs the kind of disguise that is proper to public 
philosophy, both to make accessible at all what in the public context is its necessarily partly 
inexplicit import, and to protect the students from the possible harm resulting from too 
much but still insufficient understanding about deeply unsettling issues. 
 
It is possible to offer both disguised and full philosophy in concert, since they do really both 
point successfully, although in different ways, to the same thing at the same level of depth. 
Consequently, the non-philosophical students can be truthfully reassured that what they 
grasp in the disguised form is all they need to work with, and that the accessible suggestions 
of resolution it offers also apply to the more unmanageably unsettling features of the more 
fully philosophical presentation. And since this is true, the philosophical students can draw 
on the disguised version both for overview and for the reassurance that they, too, are likely 
to need. 
 
But in the context of our contemporary educational and professional systems, the line we 
draw between public philosophy and professional philosophy is largely a misrepresentation 
of the reality. To a very great extent, philosophy in the classroom really is public 
philosophy, and our reflections on public philosophy should therefore also guide our 






Barris, Jeremy. The Crane’s Walk; Plato, Pluralism, and the Inconstancy of Truth. New 
York,  NY: Fordham University Press, 2009. 
 
Barris, Jeremy. “The Convergent Conceptions of Being in Mainstream Analytic and 
Postmodern Continental Philosophy.” Metaphilosophy 43.5 (2012): 592-618.Bremer, 
Manuel. An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2005. 
 
Clark, Stephen. “Can Animals Be Our Friends?” Philosophy Now 67 (2008): 13-16. 
 
Davidson, Donald. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. 




Derrida, Jacques. Positions. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981. 
 
Haack, Susan. Philosophy of Logics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812866 
 
Jaspers, Karl. Reason and Existenz: Five Lectures. Translated by William Earle. 
Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1997. 
 
Johnstone, Henry W., Jr. Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument: An Outlook in 
Transition. University Park, PA: The Dialogue Press of Man and World, 1978. 
 
Livingston, Paul M. The Politics of Logic: Badiou, Wittgenstein, and the Consequences of 
Formalism. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. 
 
McLaughlin, Jeff. “What If? DC’s Crisis and Leibnizian Possible Worlds.” In Comics As 
Philosophy, edited by Jeff McLaughlin. Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 2005. 
 
Nagel Thomas, “The Absurd.” In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979. 
 
Ortega y Gasset, José. Some Lessons in Metaphysics. Translated by Mildred Adams. New 
York, NY: Norton, 1969. 
 
Priest, Graham. An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
 
---. Beyond the Limits of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Ruff, Jeffrey C. and Jeremy Barris. “The Sound of One House Clapping: The Unmannerly 
Doctor as Zen Rhetorician.” In Introducing Philosophy through Pop Culture, edited by 
William Irwin and David Kyle Johnson. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010. (Originally in House, 
M.D. and Philosophy, edited by Henry O. Jacoby. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009.) 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. 
 









                                                 
Notes 
1 I have defended the legitimacy and manageability of this conception of sense as incorporating failure of 
sense at length elsewhere (for example, Barris, 2009, 2012). 
 
2  For extended discussions of the general philosophical relevance of these paradoxes, see, for example, 
Livingston (2012), Priest (2002). 
 
3 I thank the journal’s issue editor for very helpfully suggesting ways in which I could present the argument 
more fully and clearly.  
